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Abstract 
 
BACKGROUND 
Italy is a country of recent foreign immigration with a long history of internal 
migration. Concerns about economic integration addressed in the past flows of 
southern natives to the north and now the international migrants, who are crucial in 
an ageing society. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This paper studies the assimilation pattern of foreign migrants in Italy by comparing 
wage profiles for foreign nationals with both locals and internal migrants. Possible 
causes of under-assimilation are analysed by controlling for macro economic 
conditions at entrance into the labour market and for labour market segmentation. 
 
METHODS 
WHIP data are used to estimate a fixed effect model for the weekly wages of males 
aged 18-45. Controls for selection for return migration are introduced through a 
duration extension of the traditional Heckman correction term and alternatively 
through a hazard rate correction. 
 
RESULTS 
The three groups of workers start their careers at the same wage level. But, as 
experience increases, the wage profiles of foreigners and the two groups of natives 
diverge. The analysis shows that the concentration of foreign nationals in “migrant 
intense sectors” is the primary reason for lack of assimilation.  We also find positive 
selection in returns for foreign workers: the more skilled are more likely to leave 
Italy because of the lack of opportunities in terms of career upgrading. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Under assimilation of foreign workers in the Italian labour market is essentially 
caused more by job segregation than by a lack of language knowledge and social 
capital endowment or by the macro economic conditions faced at entrance into the 
labour market.  
 
 
JEL code: J31, J61, C23 
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1. Introduction1 
The populations of European countries, and Italy in particular, are  ageing rapidly. 
This process, which has important consequences for the welfare systems and for 
labour markets, has moved the debate on migration from the role of migration flows 
in the labour market to the need for permanent foreign settlements to offset 
population decline. Consequently, migration policies have moved their programs 
from encouraging temporary migration as a means to reduce the economic and social 
costs of migration, to promoting foreign integration in the economy and in society.  
Therefore, the assimilation of migrants, defined as disappearing differences between 
groups over time (Alba and Nee, 1997), and of policies that can be implemented to 
improve assimilation has gained strategic relevance in the migration debate, as a first 
step in the integration process. Understanding the mechanisms underlying 
assimilation is of the upmost importance for immigration policies whether they are at 
the ex-ante level (by selecting only those foreign nationals who have a high chance 
of integration) or at the ex-post level (by putting in place an effective set of 
assimilation policies which can be implemented after arrival). 
In this paper we contribute to this debate by analysing the economic assimilation of 
foreign migrants in Italy. Italy is a country of recent immigration, but also a country 
with a long experience of internal mobility and, in particular, of emigration from the 
poor South to the wealthy North2. This study compares the wage patterns of three 
groups: foreign migrants (individuals born abroad); internal native migrants 
(individuals born in Italy but migrating in a different region to work); and native 
local workers (who work in their birth area). With this comparison we aim at 
providing new insights into the assimilation process3.  
                                               
1
 A different version of the paper has been bublished in the EUI-MPC working series. 
2
 For a survey see Del Boca and Venturini 2005. 
3
 The empirical economic literature mostly uses the rate of post-migration wage convergence between 
immigrants and natives as a measure of assimilation (see section 3). Some authors have analysed 
To the best of our knowledge this type of comparison has not yet been exploited (in 
Italy or elsewhere) and it is highly relevant to policy. In fact, internal native 
migrants, unlike foreign immigrants, are supposed to know the language of the 
destination country, which has been shown by the empirical literature to be crucial 
for assimilation4. Moreover, internal native migrants should also share some of the 
social rules that apply in the destination country, so that they are not disadvantaged 
relative to local workers. Therefore, internal native migrants should be less 
disadvantaged than foreign migrants.  
However, evidence on Italian internal native migrants, as found in novels, newspaper 
articles, movies and sociological research (for instance Fofi 1975 and Ascolani et al. 
1974), presents a very different picture. At the time of unification in 1861, Italy was 
an extremely heterogeneous place, linguistically fragmented into sometimes mutually 
incomprehensible dialects and characterized, by a strong dualism between the 
wealthy Centre-North and the less developed South. These two areas of the country 
have been persistently characterized by two different types of social integration and 
economic development, so much so that the Centre-North and South of Italy can be 
viewed as two distinct countries (e.g. Mingione, 1993)5. 
As a result internal Italian migrants were not so different from foreign migrants: they 
had to face bureaucratic tangles and discrimination in their everyday life (for 
instance when renting accommodation). As Pugliese (2006) stresses, they never 
                                                                                                                                     
immigrant assimilation by considering other indicators of labour market performance such as  
employment prospects (Husted et al., 2001; Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Venturini & 
Villosio 2008), unemployment (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1997; Zorlu & Hartog, 2012), job quality 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & de la Rica, 2007; Zorlu & Hartog, 2012; Chiswick & Miller, 2009, Fullin & 
Reyneri 2011), over-education (Lindley, 2009; Dell’Aringa & Pagani, 2011). 
4
 For instance, Dustmann and Van Soest, 2002,  Chiswick and Miller, 2012 
5
 Different factors have contributed to this division. The north has been historically characterized by a 
stronger industrial structure and, more recently, by the development of the advanced tertiary sector. 
The south in contrast has been characterized by lack of industrial development, out-migration and 
high employment in the public sector. This dualism has been reinforced in recent decades and youth 
unemployment, black or irregular forms of employment and the insufficient provision of public and 
private welfare services have increased in the South. 
properly integrated and they almost always had wages and positions below their 
ability. 
Our aim is, therefore, first, to test whether foreign migrants and internal native 
migrants perform differently from local workers. Second, we aim to understand the 
reasons why these three groups perform differently by taking into account: the effect 
of the community of origin which might constrain assimilation; the labour market 
trends at the time of arrival, which might affect the possibility of finding more 
promising jobs; and, finally, the employment sector which might lead to 
segmentation.  
 
          The Italian administrative dataset on dependent employment (WHIP) is used to 
estimate a fixed effect model for the log weekly wage of males aged 18-45 with 
controls for selection in return migration and unobserved heterogeneity from 1985 to 
2003. We have modelled the selection in return migration for foreign migrants 
through a duration extension of the traditional Heckman correction term and 
alternatively through a hazard rate correction. 
Results from wage equations show that the three groups of workers start their careers 
at a similar wage level. However, as experience increases, the wage profile of foreign 
nationals diverges from the wage profile of natives, both internal migrants and locals. 
This result is driven by positive selection in returns, since foreign workers with lower 
wages are the most likely to remain in Italy. The under-assimilation of migrants does 
not depend on the macro-economic conditions at the time of entrance, but rather on 
labour market segmentation. Foreign migrants do not assimilate because they are 
employed in sectors that do not provide career options.  
 
The present paper is divided into the following 6 sections: (i), a brief history of 
migration in Italy; (ii), a brief review of the assimilation literature; (iii), a description 
of the assimilation model used, which includes return migration; (iv), a description of 
the dataset and the variables used; and, (v), a section of results. A concluding section, 
(vi), closes the paper. 
 
2. Historical background 
Foreign migrants started to choose Italy as a destination country at the end of the 
1970s: after the first oil shock, Northern European countries adopted restrictive 
immigration policies and it became increasingly difficult to enter their labour 
markets. As with other Southern European countries Italy, thereafter, became 
increasingly important as a destination for migrants. Italy was first exposed to 
immigration from neighbouring areas (North Africa) and from Asia (mainly 
Filipinos) and Latin America. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, inflows also began 
from Eastern Europe (See Figure 1). By 2010, migrants represented 8% of the 
population in Italy6. The political debate in Italy initially focused on competition in 
the labour market between foreign nationals and natives.7  However, the rapid ageing 
of Italian society (31% of the total population is 65 or older, one of the oldest 
populations in Europe) and the need for a permanent foreign population to alleviate 
the burden that ageing poses for the welfare state has moved the debate on the 
economic and social integration and the best policies to favour assimilation.  
According to the most recent data (2012, ISTAT) 61.6% of foreign residents were 
located in the North while only 25% in the Centre and only 13% in the South and the 
                                               
6
 The share of foreign nationals over total population is 7.4% in Greece, 6.3% in Portugal and 14.5% 
in Spain (OECD, 2012). Figure 1 is derived from residence permits, which cover legal foreign 
nationals only. Undocumented foreign nationals were estimated to be about half a million in 2010, 
equal to 12% of the resident foreign population. This share is highly volatile and it is affected by 
recurring amnesties. 
7
 The available empirical research shows that, in general, foreign nationals do not compete with 
natives in the Italian labour market (Gavosto et al. 1999, Venturini and Villosio 2006).  
Islands. In general they had unskilled jobs, though in a few cases they had higher 
qualifications. Men usually worked in construction, in agriculture and in 
manufacturing, while women worked in family services and the services in general. 
A few women also worked in industry (2011, ISTAT).  
 
Foreign migration is a relatively recent phenomenon. But Italy has a long tradition of 
internal migration from the less developed areas of the South, but also of the North 
East, to the richer areas of the North West: see Figure 2 which compares the 
magnitude of internal migration with foreign migration in the last thirty years8. Such 
internal migration flows characterized what has been called the Italian economic 
miracle (miracolo economico) that brought Italy into the first league of industrialized 
countries in the 1960s. Indeed, migration between Southern and Northern Italy was 
very important both in terms of dimension and duration. It declined steadily, from the 
1970s onwards, despite a substantial increase in unemployment differential between 
the two areas.  
After a period of decline, in the second half of the 1990s, internal migration flows 
acquired new strength, especially those towards the North East of the country. 
Most of the studies on the determinants of internal flows in Italy found that 
differentials in per capita GDP and in unemployment were the main driving factors 
(Furceri 2006, Fachin 2007, Piras 2012). Faini et al. (1997), using a special edition of 
the quarterly Labour Force Survey, show that the fall in mobility levels during the 
1980s in Southern Italy may have been driven by a combination of several factors: 
demographics; high mobility costs; and inefficiencies in the job matching process 
sufficiently strong to offset the influence of rising unemployment differentials. 
                                               
8
 Information on internal migration can also be derived from the ISTAT Local registers which report 
the change of residency. However, these are only flow data and have no labour information. Hence 
they are not suited for any assimilation study. We overcome this problem by using the WHIP – Work 
Histories Italian Panel, based on social security data – which enables us to discriminate between 
workers on the basis of their place of birth. 
Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1991) point to the role of mismatches in the labour 
market as possible explanations for the coexistence of low mobility and high 
unemployment in the South. Cannari et al. (2000) show that the North-South housing 
price differential was a notable factor in the internal mobility slow down. Using 
information on residency change, as reported by local registers, Piras (2006, 2007) 
shows that the propensity to emigrate increases with education level, and that there is 
evidence of brain drain from the South. Finally, Mocetti and Porello (2010) find that 
the recent increase in South-North flows have also been affected by the reduction in 
public sector employment, traditionally one of the most important employment 
opportunities in the South, and by the decrease in the North-South housing price 
differentials. 
Some authors have analysed the role played by foreign immigration in South-North 
internal flows. Brűcker et al. (2011) find that foreign immigration has replaced 
internal native mobility in Italy; Mocetti and Porello (2010) find that immigrant 
concentration in the northern regions has partially substituted the traditional South-
North mobility of less-skilled natives9. 
 
                                               
9
 Gabrielli et al. (2007) also investigated the mechanisms that link internal migration and fertility in 
Italy. 
3. Wage assimilation literature: an overview 
The economic literature on the wage assimilation of immigrants began with the 
pioneering work of Chiswick (1978) and the seminal contributions by Borjas (1985b) 
and La Londe and Topel (1992): all these studies were based on the US Census. The 
over-assimilation initially found (Chiswick 1978, using a single census) was 
attributed to the positive self-selection of migrant workers: that is, they were selected 
among those who were more entrepreneurial, more talented and less risk averse. The 
later under-assimilation of immigrants found by Borjas (1985b) in the US was 
attributed to the lower quality of the most recent cohorts.   
The differing quality of cohorts at the time of immigration may be due to various 
factors: changes in immigration policy, so that individuals with different 
characteristics are selected; different economic conditions in the destination country, 
which alter the nationality mix of immigrants and thus gives rise to changes in their 
productivity; and changes in the composition of the cohorts due to non-casual 
repatriation.  The same result of under-assimilation was reported by La Londe and 
Topel (1992), and it was attributed to a deterioration in the economic conditions in 
the destination country at the time of arrival, and to the reduced career prospects for 
migrants. This debate is conditioned by a series of methodological problems that 
arise when using the US Census and that can be solved only with longitudinal data. 
The study on true longitudinal data conducted by Lubotsky (2007), however, offers a 
similar conclusion: immigrant wages increase by about 10-15% in the first 20 years 
in the US, but not enough to offset the 35-40% immigrant/native wage differential. 
Assimilation is a function of immigrants’ human capital: while college degree 
immigrants earn 30% more than average natives, immigrants who arrive with low 
schooling levels never attain the average native earning levels (Card 2005). 
Economic assimilation research in Europe started a little later and has been mainly 
based on national panel data.  
In Denmark, Nielsen et al. (2004) found that wage assimilation increased for foreign 
nationals with employment assimilation, emphasizing the role of  human capital 
acquisition on the job. Kee (1994), for the Netherlands, concludes that one of the 
causes of the lack of assimilation of foreign workers is that only a few immigrants 
continue their studies in the receiving country. Also Grainer and Marciano (1975) 
using 1968 French census data in a descriptive way, reached the same conclusions. 
They suggest that the lower average wages for foreign nationals with a nuclear 
family is mainly due to lower investment in human capital, which, indeed, varies 
substantially across ethnic groups. 
In addition to the role of immigrant’s education and human capital before and after 
arrival (for a recent review see Dustmann and Glitz 2011), the European literature on 
economic assimilation has highlighted the role played by proficiency in the language 
of destination. Chiswick (1991) found that knowledge of the native language was 
crucial for assimilation into the British labour market. This was, then, confirmed by 
Shields and Wheastley Price (2002), and also by more recent studies by Dustmann 
and Van Soest (2002), Dustmann and Fabbri (2003), Haley and Taengnoi (2011) and 
Chiswick and Miller (2012). 
Other relevant variables in explaining different patterns of economic assimilation 
include the labour market situation, which determines workers’ future prospects: i.e. 
the business cycle upon arrival and the effect of technological innovation.  Rosholm 
et al. (2006) found that, between 1985 and 1995, job opportunities in both Sweden 
and Denmark,  for male immigrants, deteriorated due to increased demand for 
workers with high communication skills. 
Additional factors affecting the assimilation process include migrant networks and 
communities (Borjas 1992 and 1995, Cutler and Glaeser 1997, Hatton and Leigh 
2011).On the one hand, a migrant network can exert a positive effect by favouring 
job search and job matching. But, on the other, it can have a negative effect. It can 
reduce social integration, interaction with natives and the acquisition of knowledge 
in the host country’s language and informal life rules (see e.g. Chiswik 1991, 
Dustmann and van Soest 2002, Dustmann and Fabbri 2003, Shields and Wheatley 
Price 2002, Danzer and Yaman 2013). Consequently, policies to discourage the 
agglomeration of immigrants in particular areas, have been adopted in some 
countries. However, Husted et al. (2001) have shown that the distribution of refugee 
immigrants all around the country seems to be less efficient in integrating foreign 
nationals than previous agglomeration models.  
Finally, assimilation also depends on the characteristics of immigrants who remain in 
the destination country. As Borjas (1985a), Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), Dustmann 
(2003), Dustmann and Weiss (2007), Mayr and Peri (2008) and Dustmann et al. 
(2011) stress in their articles on the return decisions of migrants, foreign workers 
who remain in the destination country may be disproportionately drawn from the 
lower or the higher tail of the group’s skill and wage distribution. They may 
represent the “best and brightest” or the “worst and dimmest” of their initial group. 
In fact, the migrant may decide to return if the migration project fails or, in the 
opposite case, if the migration project is very successful and if it allows the migrant 
to return home and to start a business there. If those who remain are the best, the 
empirical estimates of assimilation will be biased upwards (over-assimilation). 
Alternatively, if those who remain are the worst, the estimates will be biased 
downwards (under-assimilation). In both cases they are inconsistent. In this 
literature, the modeling of “the re-migration decision” – as Dustmann (1996, 2003) 
terms it – is used as a first step to control for the selectivity of assimilation.  The 
return decision function is then introduced into the wage equation to analyze 
assimilation. 
Dustmann (2003), Constant and Massey (2003) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) 
modeled the return decision as a migration decision function of the income 
differential. They used family ties as instruments for the identification of the 
selection equation. However, de Haas & Fokkema (2011) have found that social ties 
with sending countries were not significant in the return intentions of African 
immigrants in Spain and Italy. Recent research on return migration and return 
migration policies focus more on the role played by economic prospects in the 
countries of origin in attracting migrants back home: e.g. Cassarino (2007) for the 
Maghreb areas; Mansoor and Quillin (2006) for many European and Central Asian 
countries; and Venturini and Villosio (2008) for migrants in Italy.  
 
4. The assimilation model and return migration 
The assimilation model used in this paper is the traditional human capital model 
adopted by Chiswick in 1978. We explicitly include measures of human capital 
acquired on the job and out of the job and control for selection in return migration. 
The dependent variable is the individual log weekly wage [Yit] which depends on 
individual fixed effects [αi], individual time variant human capital variables [xit] and 
a worker’s job characteristics [zit]. In addition, we control for different economic 
cycles [mrst], which affect both the region [r] and the sector [s] where the workers 
are employed and for the size of the migrant’s network [c] in the destination area 
[kcrt].  
As already anticipated in the previous section, we need to control for possible 
selection in return migration. If a systematic link between the decision to stay and 
labour market outcomes can be safely assumed then a fixed effect estimate is 
sufficient to eliminate the bias. Otherwise, if the link is not systematic, we need to 
proceed in two stages, since fixed effect estimates may give unreliable parameter 
estimates. 
We thus explicitly model the immigrants’ decision to leave the host country, by 
following two different innovative strategies. 
 First we abandon the use of a “static” Heckman correction that implies that in 
each period the migrant decides whether to stay or to leave without memory of his 
previous experience10. We, instead, follow the dynamic approach of Dustmann 
(2003) and we extend the Constant and Massey (2003) time event-history analysis 
which describes the return decision as a function of the years since migration. We 
model a “duration version” of the Heckman correction11 as follows.  
 Assume that the log weekly wage equation has the following form: 
 
rst crtit it it i it(1) Y f (x ,z ,m ,k ;a )= + η  
 
where f(.) is a function of the variables and effects mentioned above and ηit is 
normally distributed with zero mean and it is independent from the variables and 
effects inside f(.). Let Tis be the individual’s length of stay in the destination country, 
given that the individual arrived in year s. (To this end we suppress the subscript i 
which accounts for the fact that s varies across individuals i). We assume that 
g(Tit+s)=qitγ+εit, where εit is normally distributed with zero mean and variance τ2, g is 
a suitable monotonic increasing transformation and t+s is the year when the wage is 
observed.  Note that εit/ τ is normally distributed (0,1). qit are some observed 
variables that will be explained below. We assume that ηit and εit are normally 
                                               
10
 What we call a static Heckman correction was employed in Venturini and Villosio (2008) and  
usedby many including Fertig and Schuler (2007).  
11
 The Heckman correction term using a duration approach was implicitly applied by Constant and 
Massey (2003), but it was not explicitly modeled. 
jointly distributed. We assume that the time of arrival is uncorrelated with ηit. Let φ 
denote the p.d.f of the standard normal distribution and let Φ be the corresponding 
c.d.f. We only have wage observations for those who are still in the country in year 
t+s. As mentioned already, we shall derive a duration version of Heckman’s 
procedure (Heckman, 1979) to control for possible selectivity bias.  
 To do so, note that due to the normality assumption we can write ηit=ρ εit+νit, 
where νit is normally distributed and independent of εit, and where ρ is the correlation 
coefficient. Let 1{ } denote the indicator function. We then get for any real number a 
that: 
 
it it
it it it it
a /
a a(2) E( 1{ a}) E( 1{ a}) E( 1{ ) x (x)dx ( )∞
τ
ε εη ε > = ρ ε ε > = τρ > = τρ ϕ =τρϕ
τ τ τ τ∫
 
From (2) we then get the inverse Mill’s ratio 
it it
(a / )(3) E( | a) ( a / )
ϕ τη ε > = τρ
Φ − τ
 
Consequently, it follows that 
it
it sit it sit
it
g(t s) q )( )
(4) E( | T t s) E( | g(T ) g(t s)) g(t s) q( )
+ − γϕ
τη > + = η > + = τρ
+ − γΦ −
τ
 
The qit are macro-economic variables of the countries of origin as attractors for 
migrants who go back home (GDP growth in origin country)12 and of other possible 
destination countries (GDP growth in other preferred destination countries) as 
measures of job opportunities in other countries. Note that the selection term is the 
conditional expectation of the error term in the log wage equation, conditional on the 
length of stay Tit+s being at least as long as the length of time from arrival in the 
                                               
12
 The attempt to introduce income dispersion in the origin country to capture the different income 
opportunity has been abandoned because time series income dispersion data are not available. Both 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/  and Freeman and Osterndoorp  
http://www.nber.org/oww/ have been used by Belot and Hatton (2012) and Grogger and Hanson 
(2011) not in time series. 
country to when the wage is observed. From (2) we then get that t+s enters the 
correction term. In estimating the log weekly wage equation we account for the 
possible selection by employing this duration version of the inverse Mill’s ratio. 
 
The alternative method used for controlling the migrants’ selection is the use of a 
proportional hazard rate function h(t) for the probability of leaving the host country 
at time t conditional on surviving to time t-113. The proportional hazard rate model 
assumes that the covariates have a multiplicative effect on the hazard rate function, 
given the values of the covariates and the respective survival time (t). The reason for 
employing the hazard rate function is that it is an alternative specification for a 
selection term which also accounts for duration effects.  
 
i 0 it(5) h(t ) h (t)g(q )=                                                                                             
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, the hazard for the individual when all 
independent variable values are equal to zero, and g(qit) is a function of the 
covariates. 
 
The log weekly wage equation (1) is thus augmented by a selection term for return 
migration, giving origin to: 
 
(6) itsritrstcrtititiit mkzxY εφϕωληξδβα ++++++++=  
 
where [λit] is the duration version of the inverted Mill Ratio that capture selection  
when the selection model (4) is used; or the log of the hazard rate when the selection 
                                               
13
 Similarly Kirdar (2009) adopts a hazard rate function to inquire into the effect of saving in the 
decision of return. 
model (5) is chosen (note that in the first case ω = τρ); [ϕr] are region fixed effects, 
[φs] are sector fixed effects and [εit] is an idiosyncratic error component. Note too 
that there are fixed effects in the wage equation, but not in the selection terms. 
 
5. Dataset, variables used and first descriptive statistics. 
The only longitudinal dataset which enables distinctions between foreign migrants, 
internal native migrants and native locals is WHIP – Work Histories Italian Panel, a 
database of individual work histories based on Italian social security (INPS) 
archives14. In this paper we restrict our analysis to the WHIP section concerning 
dependent employment in the private sector, a longitudinal linked employer-
employee database that combines individual and job characteristics from 1990 to 
200315. Thus, public-sector employees (17% of total employment), self-employed 
workers (22%)16, workers in the agricultural sector (5%) and domestic workers 
(4.8%) are not included in our study.  
To deal with these limitations we also exclude women from our analysis since they 
are largely employed in the public sector (natives) and in the family services (foreign 
nationals). Moreover studies on family migration describe female migrants as 
followers in the migratory process and as secondary workers17. Furthermore, we have 
restricted our focus to male workers aged 18-45 in order to compare foreign nationals 
with the most homogeneous group of Italian workers. 
                                               
14
 Developed at the LABORatorio R. Revelli (more information can be found at 
www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip). For a description of the dataset, its strengths and weaknesses for the 
study of migration issues see Venturini and Villosio (2008). 
15
 There is no attrition because it is compulsory for firms to provide information about their workers to 
INPS. 
16
 These two limitations are not very relevant for foreign nationals, who are rarely employed in the 
public sector; nor do they belong to the professions, which usually employ natives. 
17
 This feature is not limited to foreign immigrants alone but it is also a characteristic of native 
immigrants: the booming manufacturing industry of the North attracted first southern males and their 
families followed later. Thus, expecting different motivations and behaviour between male and female 
migrants, we concentrate our analysis on the male component only. 
The dataset has, however, some important limitations. The main weakness is the lack 
of an education variable. Though for both native locals and internal migrants we 
might expect that age and skill level would proxy the education level, for foreign 
migrants these two variables are unfortunately not enough, given the high degree of 
over-qualification of migrants found in the Italian labour market (Dell’Aringa and 
Pagani 2011). However, the number of years spent at school has always been a weak 
indicator of the productivity of a worker given that education quality is very difficult 
to compare, both within a country and across countries, as Razin and Wahba (2011) 
have shown18.  
In addition the dataset does not provide information on the time of arrival of foreign 
immigrants. However, given that our sample is restricted to working age men, thus 
migrating for working purposes, we can safely proxy the time of arrival with their 
first legal enrolment in the WHIP dataset.  
 
Within this dataset we can distinguish three different types of workers: locals, 
internal native migrants and foreign immigrants. 
1. Locals: workers who are mainly employed in their birth area; 
2. Internal native migrants: workers born in Italy who are employed in a 
geographical area different from the area of their birth; 
3. Foreign migrants: Workers born abroad. 
 
To identify internal native migrants we used four macro areas of origin and 
destination (North West, North East, Centre and South), in order to avoid, as far as 
possible, counting commuting workers as internal migrants. By concentrating on 
                                               
18
 Since we employ a wage fixed effect model, we cannot use the Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) 
measure of cognitive differences, which is not in a time series and will disappear in the assimilation 
equation.  
changes in these macro areas in the identification of internal migrants, we are in line 
with the Italian perception of internal migrants as only long-distance migrants.  
Foreign workers were selected by using place of birth: the dataset did not contain 
information on nationality. Only workers born outside Europe and the main 
industrialised countries were chosen, in order to avoid counting Italians born abroad 
as immigrants. Workers born in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela19 were also 
excluded, because those are countries with high Italian emigration and with large 
return migration flows from Latin America.  
The variables in the dataset allow us to control for the age of the worker, gender, 
type of contract (open-ended, fixed-term, part-time), the skill level (blue-collar, 
white-collar, highly-skilled white-collar, manager), firm size, sector of economic 
activity, and territorial area. We use the data to construct measures of the workers’ 
human and social capital [xit] and of the migrant community [kcrt].  
The accumulation of human and social capital can take place both in and out of 
employment. Periods in employment allow the accumulation of specific human 
capital while periods out of employment can be devoted to education, employment in 
sectors not covered by the dataset, unemployment, irregular employment and, for 
foreign nationals, temporary home returns. Therefore, out-of-employment spells may 
play a different role in the assimilation process depending on whether the worker is 
native or foreign. For natives the periods of non employment could affect wages 
negatively, representing a depreciation in the human capital accumulated before. For 
foreign nationals, instead, the effect periods out of the job has on wages is more 
uncertain because they could acquire additional human capital in the underground 
economy or more general social capital outside the labour market.  
The migrant community in the destination area is captured by the share of the 
migrant worker community (nationality for foreign migrants and region of birth for 
                                               
19
 Procedure adopted for the first time in Gavosto et al. 1999 and also by Natale et al. (1999). 
internal native migrants) over total regional employment. Its effect can be positive by 
favouring employment and social integration or negative by reducing it. We cannot 
control for the tenure of members, nor for any active role played, thus it captures the 
congestion effect more than the network effect20. 
 
Even if we do not exactly know their destination when leaving, it is likely that most 
foreign nationals move home or at least abroad21. In order to capture the factors that 
pull migrants exiting we include in the selection function variables related to the 
annual GDP growth in the country of origin, and a weighted index of GDP growth in 
all the alternative preferred destinations. This last variable is obtained by weighting 
the annual growth rate of Real GDP per capita in the main destination countries 
(excluding Italy) by the annual flows of migration in those countries (see Appendix 
A for details and values). In addition, we include in the return equation the duration 
of stay in Italy as the sum of spells in and out of employment.  
 
The data on prime age males show that internal migrants on average earn 6-10% 
more than locals in all periods (see Figure 3). However, this difference is never 
statistically significant. Instead, the wage differential between foreign workers and 
either locals or internal native migrants is always significant and has increased since 
2000. In 2003, foreign wages were, on average, about 75% of those of locals and 
about 70% of those of internal native migrants.   
Such wage differentials are, in large part, due to the different characteristics of 
workers in the three groups (Table 1). Foreign migrants are younger than local 
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 Anderson et al. (2009) shows that both the quantity and the quality of enclaves matter in the wage 
upgrade of foreign nationals. Hatton and Leigh (2011) stress the long-term effect of the community 
variable, and even employ ten-year lags. However, as migration in Italy is quite recent, we had too 
few observations to use such long lags. 
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 Even if, over the short run, they transit into unemployment or irregular jobs, if they are unable to 
find a legal job again, over the medium term they will leave the country (Dustmann 1996, Venturini 
2007 for an overview).  
workers, who are younger than internal native migrants. In fact, South-North 
migration mainly took place after the Second World War, while foreign migration is 
much more recent (cfr. section 1). Internal native migrants are more present in the 
large and very large firms which dominated Italian development during the 1960s; 
conversely foreign migrants are concentrated in small firms, which, instead, 
dominated economic development during the 1980s and 1990s. Internal native 
migrants are mainly employed in the North West, a booming Fordist industrial area, 
which attracted workers from all over the country during the 60s. Foreign workers 
are concentrated not only in the North West, but also in the North East, the area 
which boomed during the 1980s and 1990s. Blue-collar employment dominates in all 
groups, but for foreign immigrants it represents over 90% of total employment. 
Finally, foreign immigrants are over-represented in the construction sector. 
 
6. Results 
6.1 Return migration    
According to our model, the first step in the empirical analysis is the estimation of 
the return migration of foreign immigrants, modelled both with a duration version of 
the Heckman correction and through a hazard function. 
 
The selection process is more likely for foreign nationals, while internal native 
migrants are like locals in this respect22. The hazard ratio of exiting definitively 
dependent employment for male workers aged 18-45 computed on our dataset is 0.5 
higher for foreign nationals than the hazard for locals and internal native migrants. 
This is so even when individual, job and career characteristics are controlled for (see 
Table 2). The stronger effect of selection among foreign immigrants, rather than 
among natives, require a control for the selection bias in the wage equation. The 
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 The gross emigration rate out of Italy is around 0.1 percent per annum during this period (Bonifazi 
et al., 2009). 
empirical results will show whether or not migrants are self selected, i.e. if they are 
the best or the worst in terms of unobservable skills and abilities. 
The results when employing the duration extended Heckman selection function as in 
(4) show that the probability of leaving for immigrants increases with their presence 
in the host country. This is captured by the variable months spent in employment and 
out of employment showing both a positive sign (Table 3, i). 
Similarly, the results from the hazard rate version of the selection process (see Table 
3, ii) show that the probability of leaving increases the longer the migrant is in the 
country. The hazard model was estimated by assuming h0(t) to be a Weibull 
distribution23 thus assuming h0(t)=ptp-1. The value of the shape parameter [p] 
estimated from the data was greater than 1 (p=1.64). This means that the hazard of 
failure increases over time. This result confirms the negative duration dependence 
already found with the Heckman approach, and, therefore, the temporary character of 
the migration project and the appropriateness of the choice of a hazard model for the 
selection equation. 
Both models also suggest that economic growth in origin countries attracts emigrants 
back. Similarly, economic prospects in countries which represent other possible 
destinations positively affect the probability of immigrants leaving Italy. 
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 Very similar results are also obtained without imposing h0(t) to be a specific distribution, following 
the Cox partial likelihood estimation. 
6.2 Assimilation results 
The second step in the analysis is the estimation of the wage assimilation equation 
augmented, for foreign nationals, by the selection term for return migration. 
The equation is estimated by an OLS fixed effects estimate24 to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity among individuals (results reported in Table 4). 
As expected no striking differences are found among the three groups of workers. 
The Italian labour market is, in fact, quite closely regulated and collective 
agreements cover both unionised and non-unionised workers. However, since the 
1993 Income Policy Agreement, wage variability has increased because firms are 
allowed to adjust their wage structure according to their economic performance and 
to local labour market conditions (Devincenti et al. 2008).  
Starting from the selectivity control, the Inverse Mills Ratio coefficient (significant 
at 5% level) as well as the log hazard rate25 (significant at 1% level) indicates a 
positive correlation between the error terms in the return decision and the wage 
function. Thus, the higher the expected weekly wage, the higher the probability of 
leaving: the unobservable worker characteristics that positively influence the wage of 
migrants, negatively influence their decision to stay in Italy. All things being equal, 
the “best and brightest” foreign workers are more likely to re-migrate out of Italy, 
while the less skilled are less likely to abandon the host country. This result suggests 
that the main factor driving foreign re-migration out of Italy is the lack of 
opportunities and/or low employment wages26. The positive selection in the return 
migration was already highlighted in Venturini and Villosio (2008) using the “static” 
Heckman correction and it is not unusual in the literature. It was found, for instance, 
by Constant and Massey (2003) in their analysis of guest-workers in Germany in 
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 Note that, given our sample selection as explained in section 1 and the type of estimation described 
in section 2, the time invariant individual characteristics hirs in the equation are eliminated. 
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 Since the average hazard rate is >1 (see table 2) the log hazard rate is on average positive  
26
 In light of these results, the lack of information about the family in the origin countries for the 
estimation of the selection function looks less relevant as also pointed out by de Haas and Fokkema 
(2011). 
1984; by Fertig and Schurer (2007) in some cohorts of migrants who arrived in 
Germany between 1969 and 1973; by Rooth and Saarela (2007) among Finnish 
return migrants from Sweden and by de Haas and Fokkema (2011) who found a 
positive effect of education on the return migration intentions of Africans in Italy and 
Spain. 
All the human capital variables are significant with the expected sign. The age 
variable is more important for locals, even if it declines at a higher rate, followed by 
internal native migrants and foreign migrants, while experience on the job is more 
important for internal migrants than for the other two groups of workers and declines 
at a very low rate for foreign migrants. 
Periods spent out of employment have a negative effect (as found by Edin and 
Gustavsson 2008) only for local workers’ wages. They are not significant for internal 
native migrants, nor, indeed, for foreign ones as in Venturini and Villosio (2008) and 
Husted et al. (2001).  
Dynamic on the demand side helps explain the wage growth of the three groups of 
workers in different ways. Growth in the local value added27 pushes up the wages of 
all groups, foreign migrants being most sensitive to these changes; regional 
unemployment, on the other hand, affects only the local workers wage.  
Last, but not least, the community variable is significant and negative for foreign and 
internal native migrants, which stresses a negative agglomeration effect. This is not 
an unusual result: for instance, Hatton and Leigh (2011) and Danzer and Yaman 
(2013) found a negative sign for the community variable in the UK. Given that our 
community variable represents the size of the community of workers coming from 
the same area, the negative result points to a supply effect: the network probably 
favours the job search, but not the career upgrading in a segmented labour market28.   
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 Change in the log value added by sector and region  
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 Interesting is the result of Anderson et al. (2009) where the network plays a positive role, if its 
 In order to facilitate the comparability of the results, we have estimated the effect of 
human capital variables on wage growth for the three groups of workers, based on 
the estimates presented in Table 3. These are calculated for a “standard individual” 
who entered the labour market at the age of 16, employed as a blue collar worker in a 
small firm of the manufacturing in the North West of Italy. Estimated wage growth 
for foreign nationals includes also return migration effects. Figure 4 illustrates the 
wage assimilation profile for the first 13 years spent in Italy: foreign male migrants 
never assimilate with internal native migrants or with locals. The profiles of locals 
and internal migrants are not statistically different from each another, while they are 
statistically different from those of foreign migrants.  A test for common coefficient 
restrictions was run on a pooled regression of (a) internal native migrants and locals, 
(b) foreign immigrants and locals. The null hypothesis that all the coefficients for 
internal migrants and foreign migrants are zero was accepted for internal migrants 
and rejected for foreign nationals29.  
To the best of our knowledge, our approach and the corresponding results are the 
first to address the assimilation of internal native migrants. Although this issue has 
been discussed in the sociological literature, it has never been empirically tested with 
a large dataset. What is more, the empirical results contradict the main conclusions of 
sociologists - e.g. Pugliese (2006), Paci (1973) and Fofi (1975) - who stress the slight 
economic and social assimilation of internal native migrants. Our results suggest, 
instead, that internal migrants are assimilated in economic terms. However, our 
results are not conclusive in terms of social assimilation, which needs to be further 
researched. 
                                                                                                                                     
members are well assimilated and have a high probability of being employed. 
29
 Test of the comparison between native immigrants and locals:  F(1,356376) = 0.58, Prob > F = 
0.4481; test of the comparison between foreign immigrants and locals: F(1,323473) = 6.00,  Prob > F 
= 0.0143 
As Figure 4 clearly shows, workers in the three different groups start their career at 
the same wage level. However, as experience increases, the profiles of foreign 
migrants and the two groups of natives start to diverge. The wage gap is about 11% 
after 5 years of experience in the labour market and more than 18% after 10 years of 
experience30.  
Research in Italy has already shown that migrants do not assimilate to natives: see 
Venturini and Villosio 2008 who use the same dataset; Fullin and Reyneri 2012 and 
Dell’Aringa and Pagani 2011 who employ several years of the Labour Force Survey; 
Accetturo and Infante 2010 who analyse immigrants’ earnings in the Lombardia 
region. However, few explanations of the differential can be found in these studies. 
The increasing differences between the wage profile of locals and foreign nationals 
cannot be imputed to the initial differences in language and social capital. In fact no 
differences are found at the entrance in the labour market. The gap, instead, widens 
with the time spent in the country, even if migrants likely improve their language 
skills and increase their social capital in the destination area. In addition, the 
selection of migrants who remain in Italy certainly plays a role as they appear not to 
be the “best and brightest”. 
 
In the following paragraphs we try to give some possible explanation for the under-
assimilation of foreign nationals with respect to both locals and internal native 
migrants. 
First of all, since the internal native migration is older than foreign migration to Italy, 
we analyse the role played in the assimilation by the different time of entrance in the 
labour market. Second, we investigate if Italian labour market segmentation and in 
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 Note that the graph in Figure 4 does not include the effect of periods spent outside employment, 
which have a negative effect on native wages but which do not penalize native and foreign migrants. 
particular the concentration of foreign nationals in specific jobs is a possible reason 
for their under-assimilation. 
 
6.3 Macro-economic conditions at entrance and assimilation 
The literature has already pointed out the importance of the phase of the business 
cycle migrants face when they arrive for their labour market prospects in the host 
country (see for instance Bratsberg et al. 2006). 
It is even more important in the case at hand. Native locals enter the labour market 
throughout the whole period under scrutiny; foreign nationals arrived in the late 
1980s; while a large share of internal native migrants did so in the 1970s. Of course, 
age and experience capture the human capital embodied by the worker and the macro 
variables included in the estimation capture the effect on the observed wages of the 
business cycle in different regions and sectors.  But, in order to control more 
carefully for the macro economic conditions faced by the three groups at the 
beginning of their career, we selected a subsample of native and foreign workers 
entering the labour market in the same two years: 1991 and 1992. We, then, followed 
their assimilation patterns.  
Table 6 sets out the results. Better controls for the business cycle do not change the 
picture.  As in the general case, the selection for return migration is positive, the age 
variable has a higher impact on wages for locals and the experience variable for 
internal native migrants. Hence foreign migrants never catch up. The macro and 
community variables exert the effect found in the general case. 
Comparing the results on assimilation in the subsample of the entrants in 1991-92 
with the overall sample results, we find a similar non-assimilating profile between 
foreigners and natives, and a very similar profile between internal native migrants 
and locals (Figure 5). However, contrary to the general results, a wage differential 
between the three groups emerges at entrance to the labour market too. For foreign 
migrants the gap with locals is 15% at entrance, rises to 23% after five years of 
experience, and reaches 26% after 10 years of experience. For internal native 
migrants the gap with locals is about 8% at entrance, but it vanishes after 10 years of 
labour market experience.  
The results seem again to show that the accumulation of human capital matters more 
for internal native migrants than for foreign nationals. Furthermore, macro conditions 
at the time of entry to the labour market cannot alone explain the under-assimilation 
of foreign immigrants. 
 
6.4 Segmentation and assimilation 
The Italian labour market is highly segmented and foreign workers are largely 
concentrated in low-paid and low-quality jobs even when highly–educated  (Fullin 
and Reyneri 2011): this is in contrast with the experience of U.S, Canada and U.K. 
with their relatively flexible labour markets and a long tradition of migration. 
Understanding the role of labour market segmentation in the assimilation pattern is 
particularly policy relevant given that many southern European countries, which 
share with Italy the segmented nature of the labour market, were the preferred 
destination of most recent migration flows.  
To disentangle the role of segmentation we look at the type of jobs held by workers 
at the beginning of their career and at the possibility of upgrading the skill match 
through occupation mobility. We divide locals and foreign nationals between those 
starting their observed career in sectors with a high density of foreign workforce (the 
majority of foreign workers) and those starting in different sectors. Moreover, we 
look at the wage profiles of workers who enter and spend most of their career in  
“migrant jobs” separately from those who are able to move, at a certain point of their 
career, to a different job. 
For this analysis we exploit the information present in WHIP about the sector of 
economic activity of the firm, which is detailed at the three-digit level (more than 
160 different sectors). This allows us to characterise jobs with great precision. We 
compute the average share of foreign workers from 1990 to 2003 in more than 160 
jobs identified by the combination of three-digit sector and blue collar occupation31. 
The variability in this share is very high. There are sectors in construction and 
manufacturing where the share of foreign workers is over 30%, even reaching 60%, 
while the presence of immigrants is almost zero in many sectors of the services. We 
define “migrant jobs” as those 47 sectors out of 160 in which the share of foreign 
employment is 1.5 times the average share: i.e. higher than 15%32. These sectors 
employ 70% of the foreign workers of our sample, while, on the contrary they 
employ fewer than 40% of internal native migrants and 30% of locals (Table 7). Both 
internal native migrants and locals in “migrants’ jobs” earn on average 25% less than 
corresponding workers employed in other sectors; the local-foreign wage differential 
in “migrant jobs” is reduced to 4% from the average 12% reported in table 1.  
In addition to being low-paid, “Migrant jobs” represent a trap for most foreign 
immigrants. In fact, most foreign nationals spend their entire working career in these 
jobs and will never move to a different one (58%), while this happens for 26% of 
internal native migrants and only 19% of locals. 
If we compare the wage profiles of foreign migrants, internal native migrants and 
locals who spend their entire (observed) working career in such jobs, we find that 
they are almost similar (Figure 6, Figure 7 and Table 10). When locals and internal 
native migrants are confined to “migrant jobs”, the accumulation of experience has 
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 As already pointed out, more than 90% of foreign workers are employed in blue collar occupations 
(see Table 1). 
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 See table 9 for the listing of the sectors. 
for them the same (low) return showed by foreign workers. This return is much lower 
than the return experienced by natives employed in different jobs; it is lower also 
with respect to those native workers who start their career in “migrant jobs”, but who 
are able to escape from them later in their working life. Our results are in line with 
those of Paggiaro (2013) who highlights that when considering only workers with 
similar characteristics, the different effect of the downturn on immigrants and natives 
in Italy disappears. 
Thus, most of the non-assimilating profile highlighted in the previous sections comes 
from the different jobs held by the three groups of workers. The segmentation of the 
Italian labour market is the main reason for the lack of assimilation between foreign 
nationals and locals. This last result confirm that also in Italy the immigrants’ 
disadvantage in occupational attainment is an important source of the wage gap with 
natives; similar results have already been found for other European countries 
(Nielsen et al. 2004, Constant and Massey 2005, and Brodmann and Polavieja 2011). 
 
7. Concluding comments 
Italy has a recent history of foreign migration and a longer history of internal 
migration from the South to the North.  Italy, thus, offers a unique opportunity to 
compare local workers – who works in the region of birth – not only to foreign 
migrants but also to internal native migrants – who work in a different region from 
the region of their birth. These last are, on the one hand, proficient in the language 
and in the knowledge of the social rules of the destination country. But, on the other 
hand, they face some of the obstacles to integration met by foreign migrants.   
Thus, the aim of the paper has been to understand the pattern of economic 
assimilation of male foreign and male internal migrants in the Italian labour market 
with respect to native locals.  
For this purpose, we used the administrative dataset on dependent employment, 
WHIP, which enabled us to distinguish between locals, foreign workers and internal 
native migrant workers; a comparison not exploited before. A fixed effect model of 
log weekly wage of males aged 18-45, which controlled for unobserved 
heterogeneity and selection in return migration, was carried out.  
In particular, return migration was estimated taking into account the duration of stay 
in the destination country and job opportunities in home and other countries. We 
implemented two different methods: the Heckman correction model redefined in 
term of duration and the Hazard rate model.  
We also investigated the role of two possible determinants of the assimilation 
patterns: the macro economic conditions at the beginning of a career, and labour 
market segmentation. 
The main findings of our empirical analysis were the following:  
First, native locals and internal native migrants experienced only minor differences 
in terms of labour market assimilation, while foreign migrants do not assimilate in 
the long run to either native group. Thanks to this analysis, the first using a large 
dataset and an econometric technique, all the debate on discrimination (i.e. Pugliese 
2006) and segregation of internal migrants should be reconsidered and limited to 
social assimilation. There are no differences between the two groups of workers in 
terms of economic assimilation. Moreover, this result provides indirect evidence that 
language and social capital matter for the accumulation of human capital. On the 
other hand, our analysis confirms previous findings of a lack of economic integration 
among foreign nationals and a widening of the wage gap as experience in the labour 
market increases. 
Second, our novel modelling of the return decision of foreign migrants highlights the 
temporary character of the immigration project in Italy and confirms previous finding 
of a positive selection of return migrants. Foreign workers better able to earn higher 
wages are more likely to move back home or to go to other countries.  
Third, the migrant community has a negative effect on the economic assimilation of 
all migrants both foreign and internal native, but particularly foreign nationals.  
Fourth, the control for the business cycle at time of entrance into the labour market 
confirms the under-assimilation of foreign nationals and the assimilation of internal 
native migrants. This allows us to reject the hypothesis that macro-economic 
conditions at the beginning of a career substantially affect the assimilation pattern of 
migrant workers in Italy.  
Finally, labour market segmentation and the concentration of foreign nationals in 
specific job types is the main reason for the lack of assimilation. In fact, when 
restricting the analysis to sectors where migrants are more present, we found that 
workers in the three groups have almost the same wage profile. It is the occupational 
mobility that differentiates the three groups: the probability of not-exiting from these 
sectors is, in fact, 58% for foreign migrants and, respectively, 19% and 26% for 
locals and internal native migrants. Thus, sector segregation, which means low wage 
and no career progress, seems to be the key driver in the under assimilation of 
foreign migrants.  
Labour market segmentation helps explain the positive selection found in return 
migration: the difficulties that foreign migrants find in occupational mobility 
encourage the best to go elsewhere in search of better opportunities. Occupational 
segmentation provides also an additional set of explanations for the negative role 
played by the migrant community, as it is probably reinforced by geographical 
concentration..  
Internal and foreign migrants are often considered, by employers and by themselves, 
as quite similar at the beginning of their career. However, the very limited career 
options offered to foreign migrants push the more able workers to leave Italy, 
slowing the assimilation patterns of foreign migrants with respect to internal 
migrants. 
Thus policies aimed at increasing occupational mobility for foreign workers should 
allow them to escape from those jobs where they are concentrated. This can help in 
reducing foreign under-assimilation. Given the rapid aging of the population, foreign 
migrants need to become a permanent component of the Italian economy and 
eventually citizens. Italy should hence invest in migration and integration policies 
designed to prevent the segregation of foreign workers in sectors of the economy 
where there is little chance of upgrading. 
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Appendix A: Procedure used to compute GDP growth rate in possible 
destination counties 
 
In order to build a measure of job opportunities in other possible destination 
countries (not exclusively European Countries) we use the growth rate of Real GDP 
per capita weighted by the flows of migration in the most chosen destination 
countries different  from Italy. 
In particular for each nationality in our sample we first computed total outflow, then 
the share of flows towards each of the main destinations in each year, 1990-2003. 
We, then, weighted the annual growth rate of Real GDP per capita for each 
destination by this share. We obtained an indicator of the attractiveness of other 
possible destination for each group of migrants. 
Table A1 shows the main destination countries (Italy excluded) for the main origin 
groups in our sample. 
 
Table A1. Main destination countries and share of flows in 1990 and 2003 by origin 
(Italy excluded) 
 
Origin group 
 
Main destination countries (share of total flows in the first year 1990 
and in the last year 2003 in parenthesis) 
  
Albania  Germany (5.2; 4.9), Greece (94.8; 95.1) 
Algeria Belgium (2.8; 1.9), Canada (11.8; 7.2), France (57.5; 73.4), Germany (20.6; 6.6), Spain (2.4; 9.0), United States (4.9; 2.0) 
Bangladesh 
Australia (4.9; 5.7), Canada (4.5; 14.1), France (0.9; 2.1), Germany 
(10.9; 4.2), Spain (0.1; 2.5), United Kingdom (42.5; 37.1), United 
States (36.2; 34.3) 
China 
Australia (2.1; 3.1), Canada (5.3; 12.1), Germany (3.6; 5.3), Korea 
(43.7; 19.2), Japan (19.6; 30.7), Netherlands (0.7; 1.3), New Zealand 
(2.8; 2.0), Spain (0.5; 2.5), United Kingdom (0.7; 10.3), United States 
(20.9; 13.5) 
Egypt Canada (6.9; 8.4), Germany (8.8; 7.0), United States (14.3; 14.6), Saudi Arabia (70.0) 
Turkey 
Austria (5.0; 12.0), Belgium (2.1; 4.4), Canada (0.6; 1.7), France (3.1; 
9.9), Germany (70.5; 57.2), Netherlands (10.7; 7.1), Switzerland (5.1; 
3.2), United Kingdom (0.8; 1.1), United States (2.1; 3.5) 
Tunisia Belgium (8.1; 3.8), Canada (4.6; 4.9), France (35.8; 70.2), Germany (48.5; 18.2), United States (3.0; 2.6) 
Pakistan Australia (3.6; 2.9), Canada (9.6; 34.2), Germany (20.5; 9.1), United Kingdom (22.5; 27.7), United States (43.8; 26.1) 
Sri Lanka Australia (19.8; 13.6), Canada (18.9; 26.6), France (5.0; 8.2), Germany (43.5; 8.1), United Kingdom (6.0; 35.9), United States (6.8; 7.5) 
Senegal France (54.1; 43.6), Spain (13.9; 47.7), United States (32.1; 8.7) 
Romania 
Belgium (0.5; 1.0), Canada (3.0; 5.5), France (0.7; 1.6), Germany 
(85.0; 23.7), Hungary (5.5; 9.6), Spain (0.2; 55.0), United States (5.1; 
3.7) 
Philippines 
Australia (4.3; 2.0), Canada (8.0; 6.6), Germany (2.3; 1.9), Japan 
(32.5; 51.6), Korea (8.9; 5.6), Spain (0.2; 0.6), United Kingdom (1.3; 
6.6), United States (42.5; 25.0) 
Morocco 
Belgium (7.7; 9.5), Canada (2.4; 3.6), France (19.2; 25.3), Germany 
(16.1; 7.0), Netherlands (27.5; 5.0), Spain (20.1; 46.1), United States 
(6.9; 3.4) 
Source: Own elaboration on SOPEMI data 
 
 
 
Table A2. Human capital, macro, community and return migration variables. 
 
Variables Description Source Level of 
aggregation 
    
Months of employment  
Sum of months spent in regular 
employment up to year t since 1985 for 
natives and since entrance in the Italian 
labour market for foreign nationals 
WHIP Individual 
Months out of employment 
Sum of months spent out of regular 
employment up to year t since first 
employment spell observed 
WHIP Individual 
Log VA Logarithm of value added in t 
ISTAT 
national 
accounts 
Branch and 
Region 
Reg. unemployment rate Regional unemployment rate in t ISTAT Labour force survey Region 
Share of reg. foreign employment 
Number of workers coming from the 
individual’s same country of origin (for 
foreign nationals) or from the same region 
(for internal natives migrants) on total 
regional employment in year t 
WHIP 
Country of 
origin and 
Region 
Growth rate of real GDP growth rate of Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain series) 
Penn Word 
Tables Country 
Years of stay Number of years in Italy since entrance WHIP Individual 
Age at entry  Age of foreign national when entering legal 
employment  WHIP Individual 
Note. Countries included: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Cote d`Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Lebanon, 
Libya, Macedonia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Sri 
Lanka, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and Uruguay 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Stock of resident permits for foreign nationals by main areas of origin. 
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Source: ISTAT 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Share of internal native migrants and foreign migrants on the total employment of 
the area by origin areas. 
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Source: WHIP and INPS data, own calculations 
 Figure 3. Average nominal weekly wage by groups - Male 18-45. 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign migrants, internal native migrants and 
locals, blue collar males in manufacturing in the North West entering in the labour market at 
age 16. 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Note: Foreigners (I): Correction for return migration used = Inverse Mills ratio; 
Foreigners (II): Correction for return migration used = Hazard Rate 
 
 
Figure 5. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign migrants, internal native migrants and 
locals, blue collar males in manufacturing in North West entering in the labour market at age 
16 in 1991 and 1992. 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign migrants, and locals, blue collar males in 
manufacturing in North West entering in the labour market at age 16 by type of jobs 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 Figure 7. Experience- log wage profiles for foreign migrants and internal native migrants, 
blue collars males in manufacturing in north west entering in the labour market at age 16 by 
type of jobs 
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Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 1990-2003 for foreign immigrants, internal native migrants 
and locals. 
 
 Foreign immigrants Internal native 
migrants Locals 
Variable Mean (Std. Err.) Mean (Std. Err.) Mean (Std. Err.) 
       
Weekly wage 290.9 (119.6) 358.2 (202.2) 329.5 (182.4) 
Age 31.79 (6.1)  31.79 (6.0) 30.85 (6.1) 
Age at entrance 27.93 (5.5) 23.75 (4.4) 22.79 (4.1) 
Months of employment 42.88 (38.4) 85.14 (57.4) 90.01 (58.4) 
Months out of employment 10.27 (19.2) 19.65 (31.6) 15.13 (26.9) 
Blue collar 0.93 (0.3) 0.68 (0.5) 0.64 (0.5) 
White collar 0.03 (0.2) 0.30 (0.5) 0.32 (0.5) 
Apprentices 0.03 (0.2) 0.02 (0.1) 0.04 (0.2) 
Atypical 0.14 (0.3) 0.11 (0.3) 0.11 (0.3) 
Firm size 0_20 0.58 (0.5) 0.40 (0.5) 0.45 (0.5) 
Firm size 20_200 0.30 (0.5) 0.29 (0.5) 0.28 (0.4) 
Firm size 200_1000 0.08 (0.3) 0.15 (0.4) 0.12 (0.3) 
Firm size _over1000 0.05 (0.2) 0.17 (0.4) 0.14 (0.3) 
North West 0.39 (0.5) 0.48 (0.5) 0.31 (0.5) 
North East 0.37 (0.5) 0.25 (0.4) 0.23 (0.4) 
Centre 0.18 (0.4) 0.21 (0.4) 0.19 (0.4) 
South 0.05 (0.2) 0.06 (0.2) 0.28 (0.4) 
Manufacturing 0.52 (0.5) 0.47 (0.5) 0.50 (0.5) 
Construction 0.21 (0.4) 0.16 (0.4) 0.13 (0.3) 
Services 0.27 (0.4) 0.38 (0.5) 0.38 (0.5) 
Mediterranean Africa 0.26 (0.4)     
Africa other 0.25 (0.4)     
Latin America 0.03 (0.2)     
Asia 0.17 (0.4)     
East Europe 0.29 (0.5)     
Avg. community size by region  0.63% (0.6%) 2.4% (1.6%)   
N. observations 44447  62484  371481  
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 Table 2. Results of a duration model on the probability of leaving the WHIP dataset 
 
 Hazard Ratio 
Foreign immigrants 1.5129 *** 
 
(0.0384) 
 
Internal native migrants 1.0256  
 
(0.0173) 
 
Locals benchmark 
 
  
N. obs 78157 
 
Log likelihood -45419.11 
 
Chi2 49959.44 
 
Prob>chi2 0   
Dependent variable: Presence in the WHIP dataset in years.  
Further covariates: age, age^2, weekly wage, occupation, tenure, firm size, sector, year of entry. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations 
 
 
Table 3. Results of the selection equation. 
 
  (i) (ii) 
  
Probit Random 
Effect model 
Weibull Hazard Rate 
model 
 Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
Growth rate of Real GDP p.c. in origin country 0.0093 *** 1.1084 *** 
 (0.0022)  (0.0104)  
Growth rate of weighted average Real GDP p.c. in 
potential destination country 0.0446 *** 1.1251 *** 
 (0.0079)  (0.0140)  
Months of employment 0.0103 ***   
 (0.0015)    
Months out of employment  0.0104 ***   
 (0.0010)    
Age at entry   1.0227 *** 
   (0.0035)  
p (shape parameter)   1.6658   
   (0.0243)  
1/p   0.6003   
   (0.0088)  
Predicted hazard rate (std. dev.)   0.2529  
   (0.4282)  
N. obs 36663  8439  
Log likelihood -12579.15  -3182.37  
Chi2 3700.22  4420.36  
Prob>chi2 0   0   
Dependent variable: probability of leaving (i) and duration of staying in years (ii) 
(i) Includes in addition all variables in wage equation (see table 4).  
(ii) Further controls: year of entrance, firm size, sector and  region dummies 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; 
*** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
 Table 4. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms, males aged 18-45. 
 
  Foreign immigrants Foreign immigrants 
Internal native 
migrants Locals 
 (i) Correction= (ii) Correction=     
  Inv. Mills Ratio Hazard .Rate         
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept 4.1203 *** 4.4905 *** 4.4935 *** 4.5044 *** 
 
(0.2282)  (0.2268)  (0.128) 
 
(0.034) 
 
Age 0.0287 *** 0.0302 *** 0.0421 *** 0.0527 *** 
 
(0.0090)  (0.0089)  (0.008) 
 
(0.003) 
 
Age ^2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 * -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** 
 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.00004) 
 
(0.00001) 
 
Months of employment 0.0026 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0022 *** 
 
(0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
Months of employment ^2 -0.000005 *** -0.000004 *** -0.000009 *** -0.000007 *** 
 
(0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
 
(0.0000) 
 
Months out of employment 0.0011  0.0008   -0.0004  -0.0006 ** 
 
(0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0006) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
Log Value Added 0.1587 *** 0.0810 *** 0.0616 *** 0.0752 *** 
 
(0.0285)  (0.0209)  (0.011) 
 
(0.004) 
 
Regional unemployment rate -0.0011  -0.0011   -0.0007  -0.0022 *** 
 
(0.0009)  (0.0009)  (0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
Share of regional foreign employm. -6.0484 *** -2.9723 ** -1.6862 ***   
 
(1.5805)  (1.5191)  (0.577) 
   
Share of regional foreign empl. ^2 1.5879 ** 0.5891  0.0953    
 
(0.5408)  (0.5307)  (0.063) 
   
Correction for return migration 0.0291 *** 0.0026 ***     
 
(0.0066)  (0.0008)  
    
N obs 27,933  27,933  60,678  359,527  
F 139.95  138.75  701.73  7193.68  
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.4546  -0.4307  -0.2465  -0.3909  
Prob > F           = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq:  within  = 0.3631  0.3626  0.5261  0.604  
between = 0.0703  0.0719  0.1988  0.1751  
overall = 0.1468   0.1505   0.2720   0.2665   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and  region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
  
 
Table 5. Log wage profiles with increasing experience in the labour market.  
Entrants in 1991 and 1992 
 Foreign migrants Native int. migrants Locals 
 MEAN (Std. err.) MEAN (Std. err.) MEAN (Std. err.) 
Average N obs  3554  4878  27083  
Weekly wage in euros at entrance 213.5 (68.5) 253.4 (121.2) 226.9 (100.2) 
Average weekly wage in euros in the 
1991-2003 period 276.2 (102.6) 351.4 (185.2) 322.0 (154.3) 
Age at entrance 28.8 (5.8) 27.6 (7.1) 25.4 (6.6) 
Average number of months of 
employment in the 1991-2003 period 54.0 (42.4) 56.5 (43.0) 61.0 (46.2) 
Average number of months out of 
employment in the 1991-2003 period 14.0 (21.2) 21.1 (28.3) 16.0 (24.7) 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 
Table 6. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
entrants in 1991 and 1992. 
 
 Foreign migrants Native int. migrants Locals 
       
Intercept 4.821 *** 4.509 *** 4.786 *** 
 (0.1679)  (0.3300)  (0.1277)  
Age 0.044 *** 0.063 *** 0.066 *** 
 (0.0057)  (0.0050)  (0.0017)  
Age ^2 -0.0005 *** -0.0004 ** -0.0003 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment 0.0009 ** 0.0016 *** 0.0012 *** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment ^2 0.00000   -0.00001 *** -0.00001 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Months out of employment 0.00000  -0.002 *** -0.001 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0006)  (0.0002)  
Log VA 0.061 *** 0.146 *** 0.053 *** 
 (0.0186)  (0.0361)  (0.0140)  
Regional unemployment rate 0.000  -0.122  -0.003 *** 
 (0.0038)  (0.0855)  (0.0009)  
Share of regional foreign employm. -3.089 ** 0.495     
 (1.3174)  (1.1834)    
Corr. for return migr. (Hazard Rate) 0.011 **     
 (0.0051)      
N obs 3554  4878  27083  
F 78.26  34.33  507.59  
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.3933  -0.1954  -0.3438  
Prob > F           = 0  0  0  
R-sq:  within  = 0.4407  0.5222  0.589  
between = 0.1219  0.1498  0.2466  
overall = 0.2233   0.2484   0.3603   
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
Table 7. Average wage by sectors. Average 1990-2003 
 
  
Sectors with high 
incidence of foreign 
employment 
(immigrants’ jobs) 
Others 
Share of workers 
never moving to 
other sectors 
Foreign 
immigrants 
Wage 
(std. err) 
275.94 
 (82.9) 
303.10  
(129.0) 
0.58 Share of 
employment 0.72 0.28 
Locals 
Wage 
(std. err) 
295.53  
(107.7) 
369.19 
 (174.6) 
0.19 Share of 
employment 0.30 0.70 
Internal native 
migrants 
Wage 
(std. err) 
304.87 
 (108.6) 
410.05 
 (203.3) 
0.26 Share of 
employment 0.39 0.61 
Average share of foreign workers on 
total sector employment 0.22 0.05  
 
 
Note:  
Immigrants’ jobs are defined on the basis of the NACE 1970 3-digit definitions of sectors and 
include: Construction of flats, office blocks, hospitals and other buildings, both residential and non-
residential; Hotels and catering, Manufacture of structural metal products; Building completion work; 
Processing of plastics; Secondary transformation, treatment and coating of metals; Travel agents, 
freight brokers and other agents facilitating the transport of passengers or goods; storage and 
warehousing; Tanning and dressing of leather; Foundries; Manufacture of mass-produced footwear; 
Manufacture of ready-made clothing and accessories; Working of stone and of non-metallic mineral 
products; Manufacture of concrete, cement or plaster products for constructional purposes; 
Manufacture of rubber products; Manufacture of ceramic goods; Slaughtering, preparing and 
preserving of meat; Textile finishing; Manufacture of products from leather and leather substitutes; 
Forging; drop forging, closed die-forging, pressing and stamping; Miscellaneous textile industries; 
Knitting industry; Manufacture of agricultural machinery and tractors; Cleaning services; Manufacture 
of household textiles and other made-up textile goods; Sawing and processing of wood; Manufacture 
of clay products for constructional purposes; Manufacture of wooden containers; Dealing in scrap and 
waste materials; Bespoke tailoring, dressmaking and hatmaking; Manufacture of articles of cork and 
articles of straw and other plaiting materials; manufacture of brushes and brooms; Preparation, 
spinning and weaving of flax, hemp and ramie; Production of hand-made footwear; Silk industry; 
Other wood manufactures (except furniture); Laundries, dyers and cleaners and similar services; 
Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables; Civil engineering: construction of roads, bridges, 
railways, etc.; Recreational services and other cultural services; Other metal workshops not elsewhere 
specified; Boilermaking, manufacture of reservoirs, tanks and other sheet-metal containers; 
Manufacture of tools and finished metal goods, except electrical equipment; Supporting services to 
transport; Cotton industry; Manufacture of carpentry and joinery components and of parquet flooring. 
 
 Table 8.a. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
by sectors. Foreign immigrants and Locals 
 
 
 
Foreign migrants in  
Immigrants’ jobs 
Locals always  
in Immigrants jobs 
Locals starting  
in Imm. Jobs 
& then moving 
Locals never 
in Immigrants 
jobs 
   
  
    
Intercept 4.4834 *** 4.443 *** 4.4704 *** 4.5036 *** 
 
(0.2391) 
 
(0.0863)  (0.0811)  (0.0408)  
Age 0.0463 *** 0.0473 *** 0.0539 *** 0.0454 *** 
 
(0.0033) 
 
(0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0012)  
Age ^2 -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0002 *** 
 
(0.00008) 
 
(0.00003)  (0.00005)  (0.00002)  
Months of employment 0.0007 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0024 *** 0.0029 *** 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0001)  
Months of employment ^2 0.00000  0.00000 *** 0.00000 *** -0.00001 *** 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  
Months out of employment 0.0004  -0.0002 *** -0.0003 *** -0.0001 *** 
 
(0.00065) 
 
(0.00003)  (0.00004)  (0.00002)  
Corr. for return migr.  0.0018 **       
 
(0.00104) 
 
  
    
N obs 16101  68101  39517  251909  
F 87.01 *** 1243.14 *** 786.55 *** 6196.87 *** 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5959  -0.4578  -0.3973  -0.2875  
Prob > F           = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq:  within  = 0.3243  0.5115  0.5604  0.6377  
between = 0.022  0.0447  0.1172  0.3365  
overall = 0.0671  0.1552  0.2824  0.4017  
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
 Table 8.b. Fixed effect estimates of log weekly wage in nominal terms for males aged 18-45, 
by sectors. Foreign immigrants and internal native migrants 
 
 
 
Foreign migrants in  
Immigrants’ jobs 
Internal native 
migrants always  
in Immigrants 
jobs 
Internal native 
migrants starting  
in immigrants 
jobs & then 
moving 
Internal native 
migrants never in 
Immigrants jobs 
   
  
    
Intercept 4.4834 *** 4.440 *** 4.480 *** 4.522 *** 
 
(0.2391) 
 
(0.2266)  (0.2086)  (0.1201)  
Age 0.0463 *** 0.0542 *** 0.0349 *** 0.0423 *** 
 
(0.0033) 
 
(0.0044)  (0.0060)  (0.0038)  
Age ^2 -0.0003 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.00009 *** 
 
(0.00008) 
 
(0.00008)  (0.0004)  (0.00006)  
Months of employment 0.0007 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0039 *** 0.0036 *** 
 
(0.0001) 
 
(0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0003)  
Months of employment 
^2 0.00000  0.00000 
*** 
0.00000 
*** 
-0.00001 
*** 
 
(0.00000) 
 
(0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  
Months out of 
employment 0.0004  -0.0004 
*** 
-0.0002 
* 
-0.0001 
 
 
(0.00065) 
 
(0.00008)  (0.0001)  (0.00005)  
Corr. for return migr.  0.0018 **       
 
(0.00104) 
 
  
    
N obs 16101  15912  7523  37243  
F 87.01 *** 21608.7 *** 118.15 *** 594.58 *** 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5959  -0.4971  -0.3512  -0.2707  
Prob > F           = 0  0  0  0  
R-sq:  within  = 0.3243  0.4398  0.517  0.5745  
between = 0.022  0.04  0.1263  0.238  
overall = 0.0671  0.1204  0.305  0.2821  
Dependent variable: log weekly wage.  
Further controls: type of contract, firm size, sector and region dummies. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the 0.01 level. 
Source: WHIP, own calculations. 
 
